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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CHEVRON 
CRAIG W. 
R. KENT 
CHEMICAL COMPANY, ) 
Plaintiff-
vs. 
ME CHAM, 
Defendant-
and 
HEILESON, 
Defendant. 
-Appellant, ) 
•Respondent, ) 
J 
Case No. 14423 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
CHEVRON CHEMICAL COMPANY 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This appeal raises the issue whether a Utah resident 
who incorporates a business in Idaho for personal profit, and 
who personally guarantees the Idaho business account of such 
corporation, but who regularly engages in the management of 
such corporation only by long-distance communication, is 
subject to suit in Idaho upon default on such personally 
guaranteed account. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Seventh District Court of Idaho, Bonneville 
County, took jurisdiction of the action and gave judgment 
against the Utah resident. The Third District Court of Utah, 
Honorable James Sawaya presiding, dismissed plaintiff-appel-
lantfs action to enforce the Idaho judgment. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The present appeal seeks reversal of the Third 
District Court dismissal, and an order that summary judgment 
be entered for plaintiff-appellant. •,..-,'• 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The essential jurisdictional facts were all admitted, 
either in the Complaint and Answer, Requests for Admissions 
and Answers, or the Deposition of defendant-respondent Mecham 
taken September 9, 1975. The admitted jurisidctional facts 
are as follows: In or about 1968, defendant-respondent 
Mecham and defendant Heileson, and their fathers, incorporated 
Great Basin Grain Company as an Idaho corporation, having its 
chief place of business at Tetonia, Idaho. The intent of 
the incorporation was to obtain profits for the incorporators. 
The day-to-day management of Great Basin Grain Company was 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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given to defendant Heileson. Defendant-respondent Mecham 
ordinarily remained in Utah. Mecham, however, received from 
defendant Heileson at least annually, telephone reports on 
the conduct of the business and gave his advice as to such 
reports. On at least one occasion, Mecham traveled to Idaho 
on business of Great Basin Grain Company. In or prior to 
August, 1968, it was determined by Great Basin Grain Company 
to open an account with Chevron Chemical Company for the pur-
chase of various products, chiefly fertilizer. Mecham and 
Heileson were informed by Chevron that credit would not be so 
extended unless personal guarantees of the account were re-
ceived by Chevron from incorporators of Great Basin. A joint 
guarantee was thereupon given by Mecham and Heileson. The form 
of guarantee was prepared by Chevron at its Portland, Oregon, 
office. The document was then mailed to Idaho where it was 
signed by Heileson, and to Utah, where it was signed by Mecham. 
Thereupon, an account was opened pursuant to which Chevron 
would deliver products to Great Basin Grain Company at Tetonia, 
Idaho, and there receive payment for the same. When Great 
Basin defaulted on its account, suit was brought in Idaho on 
the guarantee, resulting in the judgment now sought to be 
enforced. Mecham was served in Utah under the Idaho long-arm 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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statute. Heileson was served in Idaho. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT WAS, DOING BUSINESS IN 
* IDAHO BY CORPORATE AGENT/ "^ 
The Idaho long-arm statute, Idaho Code Section 5-514, 
is as follows: 
"5-514• Acts subjecting persons to jurisdiction 
of courts of state. 
"Any person, firm, company, association or 
corporation, whether or not a citizen or resident 
of this state, who in person or through an agent 
does any of the acts hereinafter enumerated, 
thereby submits said person, firm, company, asso-
ciation or corporation, and if an individual, his 
personal representative, to the jurisdiction of 
the courts of this state as to any cause of action 
arising from the doing of any of said acts: 
(a) The transaction of any business within 
this state which is hereby defined as the 
doing of any act for the purpose of realizing 
pecuniary benefit or accomplishing or attempting 
to accomplish, transact or enhance the business 
purpose or objective or any part thereof of such 
person, firm, company, association or corporation; 
(b) The commission of a tortious act within 
this state; 
(c) The ownership, use or possession of any 
real property situate within this state; 
(d) Contracting to insure any person, 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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property or risk located within this state 
at the time of contracting; 
(e) The maintenance within this state of 
matrimonial domicile at the time of the 
commission of any act giving rise to a cause 
of action for divorce or separate maintenance.ff 
The case of Salter v. Lawn, 294 F.Supp. 882 (D.C. 
Mass. 1968) arose upon facts and under a statute essentially 
identical to those involved in the present case. There defend-
ant, a New Jersey resident, organized a New York corporation to 
do business in Massachusetts. Defendant was to receive 107o of 
the profits and remit the remainder to a financial backer. 
Defendant went to Massachusetts in connection with the organi-
zation and subsequently in connection with the business. The 
corporation became indebted to Massachusetts banks on notes of 
the corporation, apparently made in New York and delivered in 
Massachusetts. Defendant personally guaranteed the notes by 
endorsing them, apparently also in New York. When the corpora-
tion went bankrupt, it appeared that defendant had caused cor-
porate funds to be used to pay off the guaranteed notes. The 
trustee of the bankrupt sued in Massachusetts, serving defendant 
in New Jersey, alleging that such payments were unlawful and 
that defendant remained liable on the guarantees. The U. S. 
District Court asserted jurisdiction, denying a motion to quash, 
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on the following grounds: 
The "Long Arm11 statute, Mass. G.L. c. 223A 
§3(a) provides that "... a court may exercise 
personal jurisdiction over a person, who acts 
directly or by an agent, as to a cause of action 
arising from the person's ... transacting any 
business in this commonwealth." Of course, the 
statute is incorporated by reference as appropriate 
for service in an action brought in the United 
States District Court for the District of Massa-
chusetts. 
On the facts recited, defendant having organized, 
used, and controlled the bankrupt corporation with 
the sole purpose of carrying out his agreement with 
the bishop under which he is to receive 107o and the 
bishop 907o of the profits of the nursing homes, it 
follows as a matter of law that: 
(1) The bankrupt corporation was in all its 
business defendant's agent. 
(2) Defendant was "a person who acts... by an 
agent" as to all causes of action arising from the 
bankrupt corporation's "transacting any business in 
the commonwealth." 
(3) The bankrupt corporation's uses of its 
deposits in a Massachusetts bank to pay obligations 
due to that bank in Massachusetts were examples of 
defendant himself and not merely the bankrupt corpo-
ration "transacting... business in this Commonwealth." 
The only substantial difference between Salter v. Lawn and the 
present case is that Great Basin Grain Company was not only 
doing business in Idaho, it was an Idaho corporation. 
While cases involving guarantees are not numerous, 
there is sufficient agreement among courts which have considered 
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the problem to support the statement of a general rule that in 
a commercial setting the giving of a guarantee of performance 
of a contract is sufficient transaction of business within the 
state in which the contract is to be performed to submit the 
guarantor to that state's jursidiction under the usual long-
arm statute. 
In State ex. rel. Ware v. Hieber, 515 P.2d 721 (Or. 
1973), defendants, California residents, gave a personal 
guarantee of the account of a Nevada corporation doing business 
in Oregon. The guarantee was prepared in New York, executed in 
California, and returned to New York. It recited that it was 
governed by the laws of New York. The Oregon Court found 
jurisdiction in Oregon over the California defendants. The 
Court said: 
If we were to view the Ware's guarantee as a 
transaction completely separate from the transaction 
between Black Diamond and Keller Enterprises, the 
connection between the Wares and Oregon would be 
slender. We do not consider it realistic, however, 
to consider the guarantee in a vacuumc From the 
standpoint of "fairness" to the parties and con-
venience to the parties and from the standpoint of 
the interests of the State of Oregon, we are of the 
opinion that the personal guarantee of the Wares must 
be considered as one aspect of the entire course of 
business between Keller Enterprises and Black Diamond. 
In F i r s t - C i t i z e n s Bank & Trust Co. v . McDaniel, 197 
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S.E.2d 556 (N.C. 1973), involving a guarantee of a commercial 
loan, the North Carolina Court said: ffWhere the non-resident 
defendant promises to pay the debt of another, which debt is 
owed to North Carolina creditors, such promise is a contract to 
be performed in North Carolina and is sufficient minimal con-
tract upon which this state may assert personal jurisdiction 
over the defendant.!f -
Two cases involving guarantees have found no juris-
diction over the non-resident guarantor. These cases are 
readily distinguished from the present case, however. Misco 
Leasing, Inc. v. Vaughan, 450 F.2d 257 (10 Cir. 1971), in-
volved a contract signed in Oklahoma for delivery to an Okla-
homa business of machinery from Kansas. A guarantee of pay-
ment was signed in Oklahoma. The contracting party and the 
guarantor were residents of Oklahoma. The court found no 
jurisdiction in Kansas over the Oklahoma defendants. Clearly, 
however, the case involved guarantee of a contract to be per-
formed in Oklahoma, and had been given to further the activities 
of an Oklahoma business. In D.E.B. Adjustment Co. v. Dillard, 
508 P.2d 420 (Colo. 1973), a California resident executed a 
note in Colorado for payment of a Colorado debt (for college 
room and board). Subsequently, the debtor's mother executed -
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in California a guarantee of her son's note. The Colorado 
Court found that there was Colorado jurisdiction over the son, 
but not over the mother. This case, however, clearly involved 
a non-commercial transaction. Moreover, the mother's guarantee 
was given after the son's debt arose. It was not given to 
induce extension of credit to the son, and for that reason was 
not in furtherance of his transaction of business in Colorado. 
At hearing on cross motions for summary judgment 
herein, defendant-respondent cited Ferrante Equipment Co. v. 
Lasker-Goldman Corp., 258 N.E.2d 202 (N.Y. 1970), in response 
to the foregoing authority. Ferrante, however, is not in point 
either on the law or the facts. In that case, the New York 
Court held that the giving of a personal guarantee of a New 
York business account by a foreign resident was not enough to 
subject the foreign resident to New York jurisdiction where the 
foreign resident had never set foot in New York. The New York 
long-arm statute requires at least one physical contact with 
New York; thus the court in Ferrante held that ff'a single trans-
action in New York1 would be sufficient" (258 N.E.2d 202 at 
204), but such transaction not having occurred, no jurisdiction 
existed. The Idaho Supreme Court has specifically held that 
physical presence in Idaho is not necessary to doing business 
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under the Idaho long-arm statute. Intermountain Business 
Forms, Inc. v. Shepard Business Forms Co., 531 P.2d 1183, 
96 Idaho 538 (1975). Thus Ferrante is not applicable in 
interpreting the Idaho long-arm statute. In any case, defend-
ant-respondent Mecham admits at least one trip to Idaho in 
connection with the business of Great Basin Grain Company. 
Thus, it appears, in view of the language from Ferrante quoted 
above, the New York Court would assert jurisdiction over 
Mecham in the present case. 
i . ' ' . • - -
POINT II. 
THE UTAH CASES ARE IN HARMONY WITH THE RULE THAT 
PERSONAL GUARANTEE OF A COMMERCIAL ACCOUNT SUB-
MITS THE GUARANTOR TO JURISDICTION OF THE PLACE 
WHERE THE ACCOUNT IS MAINTAINED. 
The Utah courts have generally required more than 
isolated physical contacts in order to constitute doing business 
for purposes of long-arm jurisdiction. The chief antecedent of 
this jurisdictional attitude in Utah is the famous case of 
Conn v. Whitmore, 9 U.2d 250, 342 P.2d 871 (1959), interpreting 
the pioneering Illinois long-arm statute. 
In Conn, the Utah defendant had purchased horses in 
Illinois by mail, sending the final installment on the price 
with an agent who picked up the horses in Illinois. The Utah 
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Court refused to enforce an Illinois judgment where jurisdic-
tion was based on such conduct. Conn founded a line of Utah 
cases in which the Court has ruled that transitory contact 
with a state for purposes of completing a limited transaction 
is not enough for jurisdiction. Hydroswift Corp. v. Louie's 
Boats & Motors, Inc., 27 U.2d 233, 494 P.2d 532 (1972); 
Pellegrini v. Sachs, 522 P.2d 704 (1974); Mack Financial Corp. 
v. Nevada Motor Rentals, Inc., 529 P.2d 429 (1974). 
On the other hand, the Utah Court has often been at . 
pains to make clear that a foreign defendant who has taken 
advantage of the benefits of the laws and economic climate of 
Utah by such substantial purposeful activity, as to have main-
tained a real and continuous business presence here will be 
subject to the jurisdiction of the Utah courts as to all causes 
arising out of such business. Hill v. Zale, 25 U.2d 357, 482 
P.2d 332 (1971); Foreign Study League v. HoHand-America Line, 
27 U.2d 442, 497 P.2d 244 (1972); Pellegrini, supra; Mack 
Financial Corp., supra. Where defendant has engaged in such 
systematic economic exploitation, it is not determinative that 
the defendant has personally entered the state a bare minimum 
of times. The latter point is readily demonstrated by comparing 
Conn with Foreign Study League, and Hill v. Zale, supra. 
-11-
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In Foreign Study League, it appeared that defendant, 
a foreign cruise shipline not qualified in Utah, sold approxi-
mately $600,000.00 worth of services a year in Utah. While de-
fendant had no regular employees in Utah, its services were 
regularly offered through eighteen or nineteen independent 
travel agents. Defendant occasionally sent employees to Utah 
to encourage the independent agents to sell defendant's 
services. Plaintiff was engaged in organizing study cruises, 
and regularly arranged for such cruises on defendant's ships. 
Defendant's officers occasionally appeared in Utah to discuss 
that business with plaintiff. Relying upon Hill v. Zale, 
supra, the Court found that defendant was sufficiently present 
in Utah to subject it to suit. 
An interesting dissent by Justices Crockett and Ellett 
in Foreign Study League points out that the physical contacts 
with Utah of employees of defendant in that case were not sub-
stantially greater than those in Conn v. Whitmore. 
In Hill v. Zale, supra, plaintiff sued a Texas cor-
poration by serving an officer at one of defendant's Utah outlets. 
The suit was for wages earned in Alaska. Defendant alleged that 
the Utah and Alaska stores were separately incorporated, and 
that the parent, a separate Texas corporation, was not present 
-19-
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in, and could not be sued in, Utah for any default of the 
Alaska store. The Court pointed out that the officers of 
each separate Zale corporation were in all cases nearly identi-
cal, that the profits of each operation were funneled to the 
parent corporation in Texas, and that the expenses of each 
operation were paid in Texas. The Court found that Zale-Texas 
had "enjoy [ed] the advantages of having activities carried on 
within [this] state to further its business interests under 
the protection of its laws,11 and that "the defendant corpora-
tion has in a continuous and regular manner over a period of 
years maintained such contacts and carried on such activities 
within the state of Utah by the various means it employs that 
it should be subject to the jurisdiction of its courts." 
The comparison between Hill v. Zale, and Foreign Study 
League on the one hand and Conn v. Whitmore on the other strong-
ly suggests that where defendant has systematically exploited 
the Utah economy by selling goods or services there and profit-
ing thereby, jurisdiction will be found in Utah even though 
defendant's physical contacts with the state have been minimal; 
whereas, intermittent physical contact with the state in con-
nection with the business out of which the claim arises prob-
ably will not be enough for jurisdiction unless it indicates or 
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coincides with systematic economic exploitation. 
Even admitting arguendo that defendant Mecham1s 
physical contacts with Idaho in this case were few, a clearer 
case than the present of systematic economic exploitation of 
the Idaho legal and economic climate can hardly be imagined. 
Mecham and company took advantage of the Idaho laws by incor-
porating an Idaho corporation to do business there. They took 
advantage of the economic climate of Idaho by endeavoring to 
sell farm products to Idaho farmers through an on-the-spot 
business manager with whom Mecham was in regular communication 
for the purpose of running the business. Mecham personally 
guaranteed the commercial account of the corporation for the 
purpose of inducing a course of business in Idaho. When 
Mechamfs Idaho concern defaulted on the credit Mecham had 
personally induced Idaho citizens to extend to it, the victims 
of such conduct ought to have had a remedy in Idaho. That is 
the force and effect of the rule established in the numerous 
cases from other states cited above: Where, for the purpose 
of inducing an ongoing course of commerce in a state, a 
foreign resident personally guarantees the business account of 
a local business to local citizens, and such course of commer-
cial conduct ensues and results in injury, the foreigner ought 
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to be subject to local jurisdiction in suits arising therefrom. 
The Utah rule is entirely in accord: Where a foreign resident 
systematically exploits the economic and legal climate of Utah 
by establishing an ongoing course of business here, he is 
subject to Utah jurisdiction on complaints of Utah citizens 
arising from such business, notwithstanding he may have been 
physically present in the state a minimum of times. 
POINT III. 
NO HARDSHIP OR INJUSTICE WAS WORKED UPON 
DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT BY REQUIRING TRIAL IN 
IDAHO. 
Defendant-respondent alleged in the Third District 
proceeding herein that it was unduly hard and unjust to require 
him to face trial in this matter in Idaho. This seems a pe-
culiar allegation from a man who incorporates businesses in 
Idaho and takes an active part in their management. Defendant-
respondent alleged that it would have been easier and more just 
for a "giant" like Chevron to forego its right to sue in Idaho 
where the default occurred and instead pursue Mecham in Utah. 
The inconvenience of the Idaho forum is demonstrated, defendant-
respondent alleged, by the fact that no Idaho residents testi-
fied at the trial. 
' • • ' . • • s . ' 
- K . 
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No Idaho residents testified because Heileson, the 
Idaho manager of Great Basin Grain Company and the chief wit-
ness in the trial, had moved out of the state by the time the 
trial began. 
The claim that suit would have been more convenient 
in Utah simply ignores the fact that such a course would re-
quire, at best, two actions -- one against Heileson in Idaho 
and one against Mecham in Utah -- and might foreclose any action. 
The obligation of Mecham and Heileson on the guarantee was 
joint. The evidence indicates that Heileson had not entered 
Utah on any business of Great Basin Grain Company. Heileson . .-• 
was an Idaho resident. It is instantly apparent that Heileson 
could not be sued in Utah. If Mecham was to be sued in Utah, 
Heileson would have to be sued separately in Idaho. Insofar, 
however, as the obligation was joint, each defendant in each 
separate action could claim that the other was an indispen-
sable party who could not be joined. Separate actions could 
result in inconsistent liabilities on the same obligation. It 
is not farfetched to assert that both Utah and Idaho courts 
might have dismissed such separate actions for failure to join 
the joint obligors. 
Defendant-respondent simply ignores these difficulties 
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of separate actions for plaintiff-appellant, and purports to 
find a balance of equities in relieving defendant-respondent 
from having to answer for his defaults where committed. Cer-
tainly the balance of equities -- and perhaps the balance of 
outright necessities -- required trial of this action in 
Idaho. 
POINT IV. 
DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT'S COLLATERAL OBLIGATIONS 
ARE NOT WELL TAKEN. 
Defendant-respondent argued at the hearing before 
Judge Sawaya that plaintiff-appellant's judgment was unenforce-
able insofar as it was partially based upon Count II of the 
Third Amended Complaint in the Idaho proceeding, relating to 
secured debt owed by defendant-respondent to Bank of Salt Lake 
and assigned to plaintiff-appellant. Defendant argued that any 
judgment based on Count II was invalid because defendant-respon-
dent was not personally served with the Third Amended Complaint. 
This argument is incorrect, as shown below. In any case, the 
judgment sought to be enforced herein was based entirely upon 
the single count of the Complaint (Count I of subsequent 
Amended Complaints), as shown by the Idaho judge's Supplemental 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
• . 1 7 . ."• 
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As Findings 1 and 2 show, the basic amount owing to 
plaintiff-appellant from Great Basin Grain Company on open 
account (not on the loan from Bank of Salt Lake), was 
$27,215.90. This figure, less a finance charge not owing, 
came to $23,343.48 (Finding 7). Interest at the legal rate on 
the account brought the figure to $30,966.69 (Conclusions 2, 
6), from which were subtracted a set-off of $1,394.82 (Finding 
10, Conclusions 3, 6), a judgment for costs of $1,608.05 (Con-
clusions 4, 6), and interest of $90.08 (Conclusion 6). Finally, 
plaintiff-appellant!s costs of $261.50 were added (Conclusion 
6) to obtain a figure of $28,055.39, for which figure judgment 
was given. This figure plainly represents an amount owing on 
the account guaranteed by Mecham, as alleged in the single 
count of the Complaint, together with interest and costs. None 
of the figure is attributable to Count II of the Third Amended 
Complaint. 
It is immaterial to enforcement of a judgment on the 
single count of the Complaint whether Mecham was properly 
served with subsequent Amended Complaints. 
Defendant-respondent also alleges, however, that after 
being personally served with the Complaint, he did not receive 
any subsequent Amended Complaints. These were served upon his 
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attorney, who had appeared specially to contest jurisdiction 
of the Complaint. Defendant-respondent alleges that under the 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, all amended complaints adding 
claims must be served upon the defendant directly, and cannot 
be served upon defendant's attorney, and that a judgment on 
such an amended complaint served on the attorney is void. 
The applicable Idaho Rules are identical to the Utah Rules on 
the subject. Defendant-respondent is simply incorrect about 
the effect of service on the attorney. 
Rule 5(b), Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, provides: 
Whenever under these rules service is required or 
permitted to be made upon a party represented by 
an attorney the service shall be made upon the 
attorney unless service upon the party himself 
is ordered by the court. 
All amended complaints must be served, of course. Rule 5(a). 
Thus, it is not only correct to serve the amended complaint 
upon the attorney, it would be improper to serve the defendant 
himself unless the court so ordered. 
Defendant-respondent was apparently confused by Rule 
5(a). That enumerates the papers which must be served, con-
cluding: 
... but no service need be made on parties in 
default for failure to appear except that pleadings 
asserting new or additional claims for relief 
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against them shall be served upon them in the 
manner provided for service of summons in Rule 4. 
New or additional claims must be served directly upon parties 
in default who have not appeared. This provision -- identical 
to the Utah Rule — was never applicable in this case, since 
Mecham had appeared and was not in default at the time the 
Amended Complaints were served upon his attorney. It would 
appear that under Rule 5(a) a default judgment based upon an 
amended complaint not served directly upon the defendant would 
be of questionable validity. There is no claim in the present 
case however that the judgment sought to be enforced was ob-
tained by default. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant-respondent Mecham, with others, incorporated 
a business, Great Basin Grain Company, in Idaho for profit, 
traveled to Idaho at lease once on the business of Great Basin 
Grain Company, engaged in the management of the Company by long-
distance communication through an on-the spot business manager, 
over a period of two years, and gave his personal guarantee of 
the commercial account of Great Basin Grain Company in order 
to induce extension of credit to the Company in Idaho. The 
credit was extended, the Company failed, and Mecham now asserts 
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that he is immune from suit on his guarantee in Idaho. 
Judge Sawaya, applying a rigid arithmetical approach, 
held that the number of Mecham's physical contacts with Idaho 
did not add up to jurisdiction. The ruling ignores the simple 
-- in fact, undisputed -- facts that Mecham was doing business 
through Great Basin Grain Company, the business was done in 
Idaho, and the claim herein arises out of that business. 
Craig W. Mecham extended his personal credit into Idaho for 
commercial purposes -- inducing extension of commercial credit 
in order to be able to carry on an Idaho business -- and exten-
sive business was done there on that credit. The account 
established thereby has been defaulted upon. It defies logic 
or justice to bar Idaho citizens victimized by these practices 
from suit in Idaho to recover the resulting damages. 
The judgment of the Third District Court herein should 
be reversed and summary judgment ordered for plaintiff-appellant. 
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